on the precedence of fact over theory.
in 2008, an exhibition about the künstlermythos was initiated in the hamburger bahnhof museum. i have not seen this exhibition, but the description promised a deconstruction of the romantic myths surrounding our conception of the artist.
one would be tempted to think this exhibition tried to contribute to this deconstruction. however, there is no need to contribute to this; over the past decennia, the conception of the artist has shifted from that of a romantic and secluded hero, a genius even, to that of someone in tune with the all-pervasive media environment, who interweaves with this environment and becomes a conscious agent in it. an exhibition like the one in hamburger bahnhof is not a contribution to, but a symptom of this development.
we are easily led to believe theory (and the offspring of theory, such as exhibitions like this) influence social developments, whereas they usually just notice them. perhaps the entire field of postmodern theory can even be seen as symptomatic of the diminishing relevance of boundaries, caused by transnational capital. of course, there is always a reciprocal influence involved here - theory and object interact. but to stipulate theory is always one step ahead seems disputable.
we may live in what is, as far as i know, the most introspective culture that has existed up till now. we theorise everything, and comment on all that happens. and so we should. the humanities are a field of phronesis; it comments and sometimes dares to make moral judgments, but there's no steady line of progress, as is the case in the predictive theories that make up the episteme of the hard sciences. foucault too recognizes this, when he distinguishes authors of discursivity (marxism, psychoanalysis) from authors of theory - the former work in a field that knows no linear progress, the latter work in a field that does, and are forgotten when a more encompassing or more accessible theory is available. but if theory in the humanities has little or no objective progress, and if its predictive value is negligible, what distinguishes it from historiography?
does not theory have an inherent propensity or urge to predict? here we stumble upon an interesting question; if the social sciences are merely descriptive, why aren't they annexed by the field of history? wherein lie the methodological differences between historiography and theory - other than in their choice of objects? (another question would be: does history have a predictive value? we do learn from the past, now don't we?)
one would be tempted to think this exhibition tried to contribute to this deconstruction. however, there is no need to contribute to this; over the past decennia, the conception of the artist has shifted from that of a romantic and secluded hero, a genius even, to that of someone in tune with the all-pervasive media environment, who interweaves with this environment and becomes a conscious agent in it. an exhibition like the one in hamburger bahnhof is not a contribution to, but a symptom of this development.
we are easily led to believe theory (and the offspring of theory, such as exhibitions like this) influence social developments, whereas they usually just notice them. perhaps the entire field of postmodern theory can even be seen as symptomatic of the diminishing relevance of boundaries, caused by transnational capital. of course, there is always a reciprocal influence involved here - theory and object interact. but to stipulate theory is always one step ahead seems disputable.
we may live in what is, as far as i know, the most introspective culture that has existed up till now. we theorise everything, and comment on all that happens. and so we should. the humanities are a field of phronesis; it comments and sometimes dares to make moral judgments, but there's no steady line of progress, as is the case in the predictive theories that make up the episteme of the hard sciences. foucault too recognizes this, when he distinguishes authors of discursivity (marxism, psychoanalysis) from authors of theory - the former work in a field that knows no linear progress, the latter work in a field that does, and are forgotten when a more encompassing or more accessible theory is available. but if theory in the humanities has little or no objective progress, and if its predictive value is negligible, what distinguishes it from historiography?
does not theory have an inherent propensity or urge to predict? here we stumble upon an interesting question; if the social sciences are merely descriptive, why aren't they annexed by the field of history? wherein lie the methodological differences between historiography and theory - other than in their choice of objects? (another question would be: does history have a predictive value? we do learn from the past, now don't we?)
posted by dennis at
3:12 PM
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