kein mensch ist ohne religion.

heidegger: "kein mensch ist ohne religion." science too is a system of knowledge founded on principles (such as: the law of non-contradiction) that are fundamentally irrational, but merely regarded rational by virtue of their widespread acceptance and apparent functionality. this certainly doesn't mean they are imaginary and can easily be ignored - what it does imply is one must recognize the belief in rationality.
of course, psychological religious propensities did not just disappear with the demise of religion - they were sublimated. it doesn't seem credible that 200 years ago, nobody liked going to church, but everybody went in order not to piss off god. it seems more likely man tends to tell himself he really likes doing what he does. before, this was going to church; now, for many, church has been replaced by sports, ecology, art, parties, etc. ((("jeder mensch steigt in gewisser weise über sich hinaus; das heisst, jeder mensch ist verrückt."))) all of these cultural phenomena have their rituals, their laws and conventions, their relics and their idols and their bliss. also, in all of these cases, these spectra are grounded not on reason, but on belief - which is why they can hardly be criticized with logic - one prays or parties just the way one has to. (make no mistake: party is religion. counter-argument: religion strove for happiness in the after-life, parties are meant to bring happiness now. refutation: what causes happiness is based not on innate desires, but constituted in relation to the law.)

two differences, however (there are more):
1. the new mythologies (in the traditional, non-barthessian sense of the term; historically constituted narratives) appear rather bleak compared to the traditional religious ones. the legendary drug use of villalobos seems hardly comparable to the legendary strength of samson.
2. particularly partying bears an aspect of rebelliousness, which appears absent from religious doxa. due to the rapid development of our world, generation gaps play a significant role - probably more so than before - and the younger generation is interpellated as rebellious clubber by the older - in a way that is superficially derisive, but only to be acceptant on a deeper level. ("you guys shouldn't drink so much" means: "we already accepted that you do.") there is an interplay between this explicit rejection/implicit acceptance and the ambiguity of terms that denotate wildness/craziness; explicitly derisive, but there is a positive element in them, most likely added by the younger generation (which may be due to the same process of reappropriation that turned terms like queer and nigger into a means of self-empowerment). us wild kids are interpellated as rebels, but the rebelliousness allowed for always remains marginal, for it is forced upon the rebels, and never defined in relation to itself. (of course, this is so by definition.) (the spatial metaphor implied by the word marginal may be a simplification and deserves further investigation.)

de problematiek van het naamwoordelijk gezegde.

ik geloof dat zowel de in het modernisme beginnende proliferatie van stromingen als de schizofrenie die onze huidige identiteitsconstructie kenmerkt zijn oorzaak heeft in een van oorsprong linguïstisch probleem. hoewel ik niet op de hoogte ben van de geschiedenis van het specifieke gebruik van het naamwoordelijk gezegde dat het onderwerp van een propositie gelijkstelt aan een aspect van de identiteit van dat onderwerp (bijv: "ik ben een derridiaan"), lijkt deze constructie me de boosdoener te zijn - of in elk geval symptomatisch voor de culturele constellatie die deze gelijkstelling (die ook op het niveau van de signified functioneert) mogelijk maakt.

een identiteit is opgebouwd uit oneindig veel facetten, en de metonymische constructie die een identiteit gelijkstelt met een (vaak ideologisch) aspect van die identiteit is problematisch. "zwei seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner brust", schreef goethe. nu, het zijn er geen twee - het zijn er twee miljoen. de "ik ben"-constructie is in dit opzicht een grove simplificatie van een gecompliceerde realiteit.

(dit probleem heeft een bijzondere relevantie voor de seksuele Ander. mensen met een seksualiteit die als afwijkend wordt gezien schijnen er vaak moeite mee te hebben hun identiteit niet te laten overwoekeren door hun seksuele voorkeur. de propositie "ik ben homo" roept al gauw een spectrum aan associaties op die nader beschouwd niets met seksuele voorkeur te maken hebben.)

in filosofisch discours is dit probleem gerelateerd aan een ander fenomeen. in het ideale geval kent filosofisch discours geen subjectposities (net zoals bijvoorbeeld het geval is bij wiskundig discours). dit fundamenteel democratische aspect van filosofie is afhankelijk van de rationalistische methodologie, die in principe beschikbaar zou moeten zijn voor iedereen (dit is disputabel).

het naamwoordelijk gezegde is uiterst effectief in het creëren van subjectposities die door associatie een zekere autoriteit kunnen verwerven. (overigens lenen ook andere grammaticale constructies en discursieve strategieën zich hiervoor: "de autoriteit van de voetnoot.") hoewel ik politiek niet in democratie geloof, geloof ik wel in het nut van een filosofische discursiviteit zonder subjectposities. de fetisjistische projectie van de identiteit van het sujet parlant lijkt me in dit opzicht schadelijk voor de democratie van de filosofie. er is geen reden de identiteit van de auteur al te zeer op de voorgrond te laten treden; als hij niet dood is, is hij irrelevant.

abduction of the left.

it seems to me the political left is primarily defined by two central elements:
1. it is anti-establishment. (one might oppose: what about the soviet union and other communist states? but do these really have that much in common with the left we currently see in the western world?)
2. it is in solidarity with the proletariat. (the main goal of the left is to improve the conditions of the working class.)

as pasolini saw in '68, these two elements can contradict each other. when anti-establishment sympathies turn into a blind hate for all institutions that represent the establishment, it can prevent the leftist "figli di papa" from seeing that the groups that function as a focal point for these sentiments represent not only the establishment, but also the proletariat.

following marx and hegel, the proletariat should not be defined in terms of working conditions or poverty, but in terms of a subjectivity deprived of symbolic / material substance. does this notion of the proletariat not coincide completely with the institution of the police - made up of individuals who fight for assigned causes they may not even understand? (pasolini's argument.) do the two elements of the left in this case fight each other?

i believe this is the blueprint of a mechanism that is nowadays emerging in many forms, that might go under the name of salon-sozialismus - a movement fighting for some leftist ideals, but thoroughly alienated from the harsh reality of the (international) proletariat. (the anti-establishment motive might in this case also emerge in the green agenda - for this too opposes itself to the dominant market incentives, and this agenda too neglects the financial strength of the proletariat.) it is internal contradictions like these that render much of the leftist battle ineffective - as was the case in the greek insurgency.

despite the righteous causes this branch of socialism fights for, it too lacks substance - and it is even less effective than the working class insurgency, for salon-sozialismus doesn't recognize this lack. in order for a new uprising to be effective, the left will desperately need the generative force of the proletariat, that realizes and combats its lack of substance, and knows what it is fighting for. in the current postmodern environment, in which power is unrecognizable and fluid, this may seem impossible - who is the proletariat in a world filled with intellectual labor, and who should it be fighting? nevertheless, one should recognize that the economic subaltern MUST speak for itself, and cannot be represented by those who have lost all sense of the real aims of the proletariat. if the proletariat has not only lost its material substance, but also the possibility to represent itself (because this position is taken by salon-socialists), its members will seek refuge in other political allignments (as is already happening), and the left will gradually lose touch with what was originally its primary objective: improving the conditions of the working class.

against beauty.

we may have inherited the ineluctable responsibility for our own lives from existentialism, but this responsibility appears to have gotten out of hand over the last decade. there seems to be an increased focus on looks, and one has to constantly invest in them to get along. when one refuses to do so, one has to bear the consequences and suffer; "if we invest time, money and pain in the way we look, we cannot let you get away with being ugly and happy."

if you're ugly and miserable, it's your own fault - if you adapt, you'll get happy. the only way out of the deadlock is subjugation to the normative ideal. that's why we wear schmuck and makeup (as simmel noted, never for ourselves). only by giving in to the hegemonic values that formulate what is beautiful, normal, and what deserves the right to happiness, can one establish authority over these values. those that create the values, are the ones that subject to them (so revolution is not possible; revolution would only be desirable for the ugly hordes, who are, much like the modern proletariat, deprived of their symbolic substance and incapable of causing revolution). this gives rise to paradoxical urges to both rule over the dominant aesthetic ideology as well as to subjugate to it - or to fall within the range of subscription and intelligibility, while maintaining particularity and creativity. (this is called style, and it protrudes all aspects of society and art.)

(the larger and more general the social scene, the narrower the ideal - the intelligible spectrum is small, and style is relatively homogenous. this is why the aesthetic ideology (like all categorisation) is essentially repressive, and must be deconstructed by people that (defy categorisation and) have style in a broader sense - broader and broader, until the boundaries are gone. the grotesque body and the styleless freak threaten the repressive social order, and should resist proper symbolisation. in this sense, self-confident ugliness is a desirable social threat.)

we have to become average in order to become happy. the ideal is essentially democratic - but only those who fit within the boundaries of the normal can participate in this democracy. the ugly (voiceless) / beautiful (with voice) antagonism is of course an illusory binary that suggests there is only one way in which the voiceless can acquire a voice (become beautiful). it is impossible to deconstruct this binary by subscribing to its internal logic - new ways cannot be found here. the currency of acquired beauty is only valuable within the system that values beauty - and the voice of the newly beautiful will automatically reiterate this exclusive system, in which the ugly can never represent itself. therefore, striving for beauty is essentially repressive.

http://www.asofterworld.com/index.php?id=68
"ME: SWF, 23, YOU: non monogamous, interested in overthrowing the hetero-normative ownership paradigm. not ugly."

what this work tells us is that fucking someone ugly is in fact the most subversive act thinkable - even more subversive than the parodied self-proclaimed rebel is willing to commit. the hordes of the ugly can lawfully claim their place beside the criminals and the illegal immigrants in the ranks of the homini sacri. and they will not be noticed.