on tourism (especially modern exoticism):
our belief in the authenticity of local cultural practice is not unlike the suspension of disbelief that facilitates and constitutes the pleasure we derive from cinema. "oh, to eat bugs, just like the thai." surprise - only tourists eat bugs. (virtuality: the tourist is interpellated as a tourist with particular orientalist conceptions. the masochist host, eager to make money, creates an implosion of real and virtual in this process.)
aforementioned orientalist conceptions follow a fairly rigid pattern. we want the other to be authentic, but not too different - for we are scared of difference. (of the thai way of greeting, for example.) difference is uncanny, makes us uncomfortable - unless it fits into the rigid scheme imposed on us by the simulacra circulating in western media.
when perceived difference fits into these pre-established schemata, the tourist gaze can succesfully disavow underlying structural differences and its uncanny potentialities - this type of difference is reduced to its own surface, and has no potentialities - our death drive and our mediated world have eroded these and transformed them into the stereotyped Other.
(rethink terminology above.)
-how to look at the indigenous?
our look at the indigenous is invested with residual power structures. there's a double bind at work here: one can look with the colonialist gaze, rooted in the hegelian tradition; or with the orientalist gaze, rooted in rousseau. both presuppose a binary distinction into us and them that seems undeniably present, and that renders a dialogue starting from an equal basis a mere impossibility. we are still walking in the zoo.
however, these problems are only hyperboles of the general problem of intersubjective communication in an era that doesn't recognize sovereign guarantors/guarantees of knowledge. (in colonialism, at least we thought we were right - now, the concept of being right seems an absurdity.) as sloterdijk says, every act of communication is a small dying. and as wittgenstein says, we only notice linguistic difficulties when they appear as misunderstandings - there's no way of verifying whether two subjects engaging in dialogue distill the same meaning, until they don't. we'll have to take these difficulties for granted, and just keep trying.
when the indigenous returns our gaze, we feel discomfort; we become the monkey being watched, by someone that doesn't speak a language we understand. the zoo looks back at us.
we interpellate the host with to-be-looked-at-ness (this is badly formulated and a misplaced reference). therefore, the host succumbs to practices that fit within the frame of what he expects the visitor to expect. (ritual dances are not performed without a paying audience.) likewise, the visitor is interpellated (reciprocal interpellation that produces two virtual modes of subjectivity - one looking and one looked at) as one who wants to indulge in the virtual cultural experiences (preferably expensive) that the host country has to offer. they are interpellated as a simulation of themselves; we are interpellated as idiots - rich idiots who believe in simulations.
what appears, on the surface, to be an inversion of the colonial situation (they extract money from us now), is really a reproduction of colonialist class distinctions (even when thailand was never a colony). they can, by definition, never make nearly as much as us - they only get the money a small minority doesn't really need anyway - or gain any agency on a global level - for they remain subjected to and constituted by our gaze. their economic inferiority could easily be calculated (less tourists than hosts, and tourists mostly go to cheaper countries - if they get too rich, tourism will diminish).
thaiboxing. when we denounce certain elements (particularly the age of the participants) of a spectacle like this, we leave the impression to propagate a certain kind of cultural imperialism: "let them kids play football, just like our kids do." but things lie different here: we are perfectly able to accept and value the otherness of the other, but here, this otherness is founded on the desire of the tourist. the audience was almost completely western - without us, 8-year olds wouldn't fight in thaiboxing matches. a naive spectator could conclude that in spectacles such as this the country shows its monstrous, but real face. the face we see, however, is the effect tourism can have on economically unstable regions.
of course, here too, ultimately, the villain is global capitalism; a system i do not want to reject for lack of alternatives, but of which i do not want to neglect the malicious effects. these effects appear in full glory in the poorer regions of a globalized world in which rich people travel.
in future of a revolt, kristeva defines two kinds of freedom; the freedom to do well within a system, and the freedom to question the structures underlying a certain system. she identifies the second type as being typically european.
were i to act according to the rules derived from the first type of freedom, and define happiness as financial prosperity (the only definition that is universal and appears to find solid ground in this instance - paradoxically enough, even the wretched of the earth appear willing to accept this definition by fighting for pecuniary emulation), i would be a typical tourist, visiting every temple and snake-show along the way. this would make a decent income for the host-country, and everybody would appear happy, lest we look at the underlying structures and analyze their potential to change for the better.
were i to act according to the rules derived from the second type of freedom, things look different. i sincerely believe tourism is hurting the country - in fact, isolationism may be the best option for a poor country, for in relation to itself, no country is poor. the problem is that one tourist less won't change any of this. when we judge our actions according to a categorical imperative, however, tourism would no longer be an ethical option.
is there an effective balance between these two lines of action?
aforementioned orientalist conceptions follow a fairly rigid pattern. we want the other to be authentic, but not too different - for we are scared of difference. (of the thai way of greeting, for example.) difference is uncanny, makes us uncomfortable - unless it fits into the rigid scheme imposed on us by the simulacra circulating in western media.
when perceived difference fits into these pre-established schemata, the tourist gaze can succesfully disavow underlying structural differences and its uncanny potentialities - this type of difference is reduced to its own surface, and has no potentialities - our death drive and our mediated world have eroded these and transformed them into the stereotyped Other.
(rethink terminology above.)
-how to look at the indigenous?
our look at the indigenous is invested with residual power structures. there's a double bind at work here: one can look with the colonialist gaze, rooted in the hegelian tradition; or with the orientalist gaze, rooted in rousseau. both presuppose a binary distinction into us and them that seems undeniably present, and that renders a dialogue starting from an equal basis a mere impossibility. we are still walking in the zoo.
however, these problems are only hyperboles of the general problem of intersubjective communication in an era that doesn't recognize sovereign guarantors/guarantees of knowledge. (in colonialism, at least we thought we were right - now, the concept of being right seems an absurdity.) as sloterdijk says, every act of communication is a small dying. and as wittgenstein says, we only notice linguistic difficulties when they appear as misunderstandings - there's no way of verifying whether two subjects engaging in dialogue distill the same meaning, until they don't. we'll have to take these difficulties for granted, and just keep trying.
when the indigenous returns our gaze, we feel discomfort; we become the monkey being watched, by someone that doesn't speak a language we understand. the zoo looks back at us.
we interpellate the host with to-be-looked-at-ness (this is badly formulated and a misplaced reference). therefore, the host succumbs to practices that fit within the frame of what he expects the visitor to expect. (ritual dances are not performed without a paying audience.) likewise, the visitor is interpellated (reciprocal interpellation that produces two virtual modes of subjectivity - one looking and one looked at) as one who wants to indulge in the virtual cultural experiences (preferably expensive) that the host country has to offer. they are interpellated as a simulation of themselves; we are interpellated as idiots - rich idiots who believe in simulations.
what appears, on the surface, to be an inversion of the colonial situation (they extract money from us now), is really a reproduction of colonialist class distinctions (even when thailand was never a colony). they can, by definition, never make nearly as much as us - they only get the money a small minority doesn't really need anyway - or gain any agency on a global level - for they remain subjected to and constituted by our gaze. their economic inferiority could easily be calculated (less tourists than hosts, and tourists mostly go to cheaper countries - if they get too rich, tourism will diminish).
thaiboxing. when we denounce certain elements (particularly the age of the participants) of a spectacle like this, we leave the impression to propagate a certain kind of cultural imperialism: "let them kids play football, just like our kids do." but things lie different here: we are perfectly able to accept and value the otherness of the other, but here, this otherness is founded on the desire of the tourist. the audience was almost completely western - without us, 8-year olds wouldn't fight in thaiboxing matches. a naive spectator could conclude that in spectacles such as this the country shows its monstrous, but real face. the face we see, however, is the effect tourism can have on economically unstable regions.
of course, here too, ultimately, the villain is global capitalism; a system i do not want to reject for lack of alternatives, but of which i do not want to neglect the malicious effects. these effects appear in full glory in the poorer regions of a globalized world in which rich people travel.
in future of a revolt, kristeva defines two kinds of freedom; the freedom to do well within a system, and the freedom to question the structures underlying a certain system. she identifies the second type as being typically european.
were i to act according to the rules derived from the first type of freedom, and define happiness as financial prosperity (the only definition that is universal and appears to find solid ground in this instance - paradoxically enough, even the wretched of the earth appear willing to accept this definition by fighting for pecuniary emulation), i would be a typical tourist, visiting every temple and snake-show along the way. this would make a decent income for the host-country, and everybody would appear happy, lest we look at the underlying structures and analyze their potential to change for the better.
were i to act according to the rules derived from the second type of freedom, things look different. i sincerely believe tourism is hurting the country - in fact, isolationism may be the best option for a poor country, for in relation to itself, no country is poor. the problem is that one tourist less won't change any of this. when we judge our actions according to a categorical imperative, however, tourism would no longer be an ethical option.
is there an effective balance between these two lines of action?
posted by dennis at
3:40 PM
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